Partners Suing the Partnership: Are Courts Correctly Deciding Who is an Employer and Who is an Employee Under Title VII by Sherman, Dawn S.
William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law
Volume 6 | Issue 3 Article 5
Partners Suing the Partnership: Are Courts
Correctly Deciding Who is an Employer and Who
is an Employee Under Title VII
Dawn S. Sherman
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Dawn S. Sherman, Partners Suing the Partnership: Are Courts Correctly Deciding Who is an Employer
and Who is an Employee Under Title VII, 6 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 645 (2000),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol6/iss3/5
PARTNERS SUING THE PARTNERSHIP: ARE COURTS
CORRECTLY DECIDING WHO IS AN EMPLOYER AND WHO
IS AN EMPLOYEE UNDER TITLE VII?
"[Elmployment relationships vary greatly and often defy easy
categorization."' Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642
states that an employee has standing to sue an employer for sexual
harassment, many questions remain as to exactly who is an
employer and who is an employee. Title VII defines who constitutes
an employee3 and an employer,4 but the definitions under Title VII,
as well as other similar statutes,5 are very broad. A person must be
either an employee or an employer; a person cannot be both. As a
result of Title VII's broad definitions of employee and employer,
courts have struggled with defining who constitutes an employee
and who constitutes an employer, especially in the realm of
partnerships.6  A "partner," in most courts' views, is not
automatically an employer or an employee.' Many courts have set
out criteria differentiating partners that are employees from
partners that are employers.8 This area of the law has yet to be
1. Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1996).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
3. See id. § 2000e(0.
4. See id. § 2000e(b).
5. Although this Note focuses on Title VII, other statutes with similar definitions of
employee will be discussed as they often are relevant to courts' rationale in Title VII cases.
See infra text accompanying notes 101-21.
This Note will not address the issue of whether a partner is considered an employee
for purposes of worker's compensation, compensation plans, or federal income tax
regulations. For a discussion of these issues, see Randall J. Gingiss, Partners as Common
Law Employees, 28 IND. L. REV. 21, 21 (1994) (discussing the issue of employer versus
employee partners in situations outside of the statutory context).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 44-100.
7. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 271 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying a test
that examines the economic benefits of being a partner); see also infra text accompanying
notes 44-57.
8. See, e.g., Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997) (establishing the
three categories of ownership, remuneration, and management to determine if a partner is
an employee); see also infra text accompanying notes 68-100.
For purposes of this Note, partners that are considered employees by the court will
simply be called employees and partners that are considered to be employers will be called
employers. Courts have used a variety of terms to describe employer partners, including
bona fide partner and proprietor. See, e.g., Serapion, 119 F.3d at 990 (using the term
"proprietor"); Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 277 (using the term "bona fide general partner"); Siko v.
Kassab, Archbold & O'Brien, L.L.P., No. CIV.A.98-402,1998 WL 464900, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
5, 1998) (same). Some courts have referred to a partner found to be an employer as a
"partner" and a partner found to be an employee as an 'employee." See Strother v. Southern
Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 865-8 (9th Cir. 1996) (using the term "partner"
to refer to a partner who is also an employer and "employee' to refer to a partner who is not
an employer); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529,1537-40 (2d Cir. 1996) (same);
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settled because of the variety of tests used by courts to make this
determination.9
Only within the last fifteen years have courts recognized that
a partner can be an employee.'" Before that time, courts
automatically considered partners to be employers, merely because
of their "partner" title." This inability of partners to sue their own
partnership under Title VII has been called the "Title VII gap." 2
Because of this gap, countless numbers of women partners who
have been subject to discrimination have been denied 'legal
recourse.'" Today, courts consider the possibility that a woman
partner is an employee, but until courts engage in a uniform inquiry
into the nature of partnership relationships, women partners will
continue to be denied the protection of Title VII and other anti-
discrimination laws. 4
In early Title VII cases, courts recognized that the purpose of
Title VII was to stop discrimination in employment.'5 In furthering
that purpose, courts must somehow recognize, in a fair and
consistent manner, who is and who is not an employee. The courts'
uncertainty in this area disproportionately affects women. Women
only joined the workforce in large numbers in the last sixty years 6
and are still a minority of workers.'7 Thus, women have not been
in the workforce for as long as men and not in the same numbers as
Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436,439-46 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
9. Compare Serapion, 119 F.3d at 990 (using three broad categories to determine if a
partner is an employee), with Siko, 1998 WL 4649000, at *5 n.4 (listing thirteen specific
criteria that a court should examine to determine if a partner is an employee).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 68-100.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 27-36.
12. See Elizabeth K. Ziewacz, Can the Glass Ceiling Be Shattered: The Decline of
Women Partners inLargeLaw Firms, 67 OHIoST.L.J. 971,981 (1996) (citing Mark S. Kende,
Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory forAttacking Discrimination Against Women
Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 41 (1994)).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 68-100.
14. The uniformity of courts' reviews of partnership situations also will benefit men, as
uniformity of review in any situation will make the law fairer and easier to follow.
15. See Patricia Davidson, Comment, The Definition of 'Employee" under Title VII:
Distinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contrators, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203,203
(1984) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1973)).
16. Women first joined the workforce in large numbers during World War II. See, e.g.,
Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal
Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 581, 590-91 (1997)
(describing how World War II increased the number of women in the workplace).
17. Women now make up close to half of the workforce, but it has taken 100 years for the
number of women in the workforce to reach that level. See, e.g., John Taylor, How We
Worked in the 20th Century, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 6, 1999, at 1 (reviewing changes
of gender composition in the workforce during the twentieth century).
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men."8 Due to that fact, many women have become partners only
recently. In light of their proportionately limited compensation,
decision-making power, and involvement in partnership decisions,
women often are still actual employees of the partnerships they
join. As employees, Title VII requires that they be protected
against discrimination. Courts must contemplate a fair and
consistent test to determine whether a partner is an employee for
the purposes of Title VII so that women can receive the protection
they deserve.
This Note will focus on courts' analyses of the Title VII
employee/employer debate within partnerships. First, this Note
will review the genesis of Title VII liability for partnerships in
lawsuits by members of the partnership. The second part of this
Note will examine recent cases and courts' analyses of partnership
situations."' Cases involving statutes with definitions of employer
and employee similar to that of Title VII also will be examined, as
they often affect Title VII jurisprudence. 0 Third, this Note will
contemplate the policy implications behind different courts' uses of
various factors and tests in deciding who is a partner. Finally, a
recommendation will be made that courts use a test that examines
in more detail the indicia of control in a partnership rather than
focusing on the financial aspects of a partnership. This test would
determine whether a partner is an employee or an employer so as
to better protect partners who are truly employees.
18. See id.
19. This Note will not discuss the reasons for discrimination in partnerships or
recommended remedies. For a discussion of those topics, see generally Bridge, supra note
16 (analyzing how gender stereotyping is a form of sex discrimination in that it negatively
influences performance evaluations of women in male-dominated fields); Nancy L. Farrer,
OfIvory Columns and Glass Ceilings: The Impact of the Supreme Court of the United States
on the Practice of Women Attorneys in Law Firms, 28 ST. MARYS L.J. 529 (1997) (examining
the effects of Supreme Court decisions on gender discrimination in the legal profession); Lisa
Pfenninger, Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession: Workplace Education and Reform,
Civil Remedies, and Professional Discipline, 22 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 171 (1994) (examining
sexual harrassment in the legal profession and reviewing the different enforcement
mechanisms).
20. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 969 F. Supp. 207,214-15 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (relying on the interpretation of the meaning of the word employee in the ADEA to
determine if a partner is an employee for Title VII purposes).
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TILE VII AND THE EVOLUTION OF PARTNERS AS EMPLOYERS TO
PARTNERS AS POSSIBLE EMPLOYEES
As previously discussed, the definition of employee under Title
VII is very broad.2 Title VII defines an employee as "an individual
employed by an employer."22 Under Title VII, an employer is not
allowed to discriminate, because of sex,23 against an employee.2'
The result is the question of who qualifies as an employee?
Due to such a broad definition of employee, many courts have
called the definition of employee in Title VII "circular."25
Litigation involving such a broad definition was inevitable. 6
Initially, courts found partners to have no liability under Title VII
for discrimination against other partners.27 One of the earliest
21. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994). Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b). Title VII further defines a person as "one or more individuals, governments,
governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts,
unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11 [of the United States
Code,] or receivers." Id. § 2000e(a) (emphasis added).
23. See id. § 20O0e-2(a). Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis ofrace, color,
national origin, and religion. See id. This Note, however, will focus only on discrimination
because of sex.
24. See id. Title VII also speaks of not discriminating against an individual. See id. §
2000e-2(a)(1). Some courts have interpreted this to mean employee or potential employee.
See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997).
25. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,323 (1992). In Nationwide
Mutual, the Supreme Court said of the definition of employee under ERISA, which is very
similar to that in Title VII, that the "nominal definition... is completely circular and
explains nothing." Id.; see also Serapion, 119 F.3d at 985 (calling the Title VII definition of
employee "a turn of phrase which chases its own tail"); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257,
263 (10th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the definition of employee under Title VII is circular in
its description).
26. Some may suggest that the Supreme Court already ruled on the interpretation of the
term "employee" in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), overruled in part by
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), but most courts have not
recognized the opinion as shedding any light on the issue. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 319. In
Hearst, the Court said that "the term 'employee' 'derives meaning from the context of [the]
statute, which "must be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be
attained." Howard McCoach,Applying Title VII to Partners: One Step Beyond, 20 RUTGERS
L.J. 741, 747 n.26 (1989) (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944)).
27. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS AcTS § 9.02[51[c] (3rd ed. 1999)
(discussing the argument made by the law firm of King & Spaulding in the famous case of
Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), and stating that the law firm claimed "that
'partnership' in a law firm did not constitute the type of employer-employee relationship
covered by Title VII"); see also JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS chs. 20-21, § 21.08[E], at 21-58 (1999) ("While employees of a partnership are
protected by Title VII, the partners themselves are not." (citing Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d
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cases that started the discussion of this issue was Burke v.
Friedman.2" In Burke, the Seventh Circuit determined that
partners in an accounting firm are employers for purposes of Title
VII liability.29 The court, focusing on the Uniform Partnership
Act,' opined that an entity that owns and manages a business
cannot be an employee.31 Judge Wood wrote for the court:
"Partners manage and control the business and share in the profits
and losses.... [We do not see how partners can be regarded as
employees rather than employers who own and manage the
operation of the business."32 The court held that everyone with the
title of partner must be an employer, because persons with the title
partner do the particular things described above.33 The court did
not examine the facts and apply some kind of test to the facts. The
court implied that a test was not necessary because the title of
partner automatically means that one has the attributes of an
employer.' Thus, the early cases like Burke either used a per se
rule of no liability when a partner sued other partners or used tests
867 (7th Cir. 1977) and Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987))).
28. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
29. See id. at 869-70. The court wrestled with the issue because Title VII applies only
to employers with more than fifteen employees. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b) (1995). Considering
partners as employees in this case would cause the firm to be subject to Title VII. The firm
had thirteen nonpartners and four partners. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 868.
30. UNIF. PARThERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 125 (1914). The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA)
defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit." Id. at §6. Some courts have relied on UPA definitions in examining the
attributes of an employer. See, e.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th
Cir. 1996). In Simpson, the court used the UPA as guidance by following some of the
common law principles codified in the UPA, such as the "right and duty to participate in
management, ... exposure to liability, the fiduciary relationship among partners [,...
participation in profits and losses[,] . .. (and] the extent of (an) individual's employment
security .... " I& at 443-44 (footnote omitted). Other recent cases, though, do not seem to
emphasize it. This is strange because in the states that have adopted the UPA, it governs
partnership agreements. See id. at 444.
Although the Revised Partnership Act (RUPA) has been enacted only in a few states,
it makes very clear that a partner is a separate entity from the partnership and seems to
support liability within partnerships for suits by partners. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §405,
6 U.L.A. 256 (1994). RUPA does not address the employee status of partners but does permit
a partner to sue other partners for various reasons and recover damages. See i& For a more
complete discussion of this issue, see generally Gingiss, supra note 5.
31. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 869.
32. Id. (citations and footnote omitted). The court noted that in an earlier case, EEOC
v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975), the Northern District of Illinois found
that two attorneys were employees because the attorneys were not listed as "of counsel" in
a firm that was not a partnership. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 869 n.1. The court in Burke
interpreted this to mean that 'if the attorneys were partners in the law firm rather than
associates, they would not be considered to be employees." Id.
33. See Burke, 656 F.2d at 869.
34. See id.
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that acted as per se rules.35 Yet, in later cases, this type of
reasoning was dismissed summarily.36
The case of Hishon v. King & Spalding,3 7 although not directly
addressing partners as possible employees for Title VII purposes,
is important because of the language that members of the Supreme
Court used in the decision. The case dealt with the issue of liability
underTitle VII for partnerships that discriminated on the basis of
sex when deciding whom to make a partner.8 In this well-known
case, Elizabeth Hishon, an associate in the law firm of King &
Spaulding, felt she was denied membership in the partnership
because of her sex. 9 The Court held that a partnership could be
liable for discrimination, because of sex, in the decision of whom to
make a partner.'
For the purposes of this Note, this case is noteworthy because
of the language in Justice Powell's concurrence. In his opinion,
Powell warned that liability for discrimination against partners
should not be read into the Court's decision given the very different
relationship that existed among partners, as compared with the
partner and nonpartner relationship. 1 Powell wrote:
I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's opinion
should not be read as extending Title VII to the management of
a law firm by its partners. The reasoning of the Court's opinion
does not require that the relationship among partners be
characterized as an "employment" relationship to which Title
VII would apply.42
The concurrence noted, however, that the label of "partner"
does not automatically allow an employer to avoid Title VII
liability.43 This point is important because it reflects a movement
away from the per se rule in Burke and other earlier cases that did
35. See id. at 870; see, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984)
(treating shareholders in a professional corporation the same, for purposes of Title VII, as
the Burke court treated partners in an accounting firm).
36.'See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 68-100 (discussing the case of Seropwn in
which the court used a multiple factor test).
37. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
38. See id. at 71-73. Seegenerally Farrer, supra note 19 (examining the effect ofSupreme
Court decisions on sex discrimination in the legal profession); Jeffrey D. Horst, Note, The
Application of Title VII to Law Firm Partnership Decisions: Women Struggle to Join the
Club, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 841 (1983) (exploring Title VII's applicability in the law firm setting).
39. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 72.
40. See id. at 78-79.
41. See id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
43. See id. at 80 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
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not examine the facts of each partnership situation, but rather
assumed that a person with the title partner is always an employer
due to her assumed role.
Soon after Hishon, courts began to examine more closely the
facts of the relationship at issue and determine on a case-by-case
basis whether a partner was an employee or an employer. In the
case of Wheeler v. Hurdman,44 one partner sued the other partners
in an accounting firm for sexual discrimination under Title VII.41
In determining whether Wheeler was an employee or employer, the
court noted that Wheeler gave up certain rights of an employee to
become a partner and gained other rights as a general partner.
Her duties after she became a partner, though, remained the same
as before she became a partner.47 The court decided that because
the Supreme Court had not ruled on the issue of liability within a
partnership, the Eleventh Circuit's view that partners are not
employees should stand.48 Still, the court opined that the chance of
discrimination in a partnership would become more likely as the
number of partnerships, and the number of women in partnerships
continued to grow.' 9
The court applied what has become known as the "economic
realities test."' The focus of the test is "whether the individual is
economically dependent on the business to which he renders
service."51 As with most courts, the Wheeler court relied on five
factors in applying the economic realities test: "(1) the degree of
control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the
worker's opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker's investment
in the business; (4) the permanence of the working relationship; and
(5) the degree of skill required to perform the work."52 The court
also listed factors that were "unhelpful" in deciding whether a
44. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987).
45. See ia at 258.
46. See id. at 260-61.
47. See id. at 261.
48. See id. at 265.
49. See id. at 266 & n.17 (citing statistics that showed the number of partnerships were
increasing). At the time, Main Hurdman, the accounting firm involved in the case, had 3570
personnel, 502 (14%) of which were partners. See id. at 260.
50. See id. at 268; see also Gingess, supra note 5, at 35 (discussing the economic realities
test); Alan Ross Haguewood, Gray Power in the Gray Area Between Employer and Employee:
The Applicability of the ADEA to Members ofLimited Liability Companies, 51 VAND. L. REV.
429,444-47 (1998) (same); McCoach, supra note 26, at 746-50 (same); Leigh Pokora, Partners
as Employees Under Title VII: The Saga Continues, A Comment on the State of the Law, 22
Oino N.U. L. REv. 249, 258-59 (1995) (same).
51. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 271.
52. Id.
2000]
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partner is an employee, s and concluded by stating that "bona fide
general partners are not employees under the Anti-discrimination
Acts."
Still, the court believed that some partners could be employees,
because Congress thought of the employer/employee relationship as
one of master and servant, not as one determined by a person's title
within an organization.55 Yet, it found Wheeler, the plaintiff, a
bona fide partner because of her liability for profits and losses,
investment in the firm, partial ownership of firm assets, and voting
rights." Wheeler is still cited often because it was one of the initial
cases that looked beyond the title of partner to distinguish between
who is an employee and who is an employer. 7
MODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE FACTORS CONSIDERED BY COURTS
TODAY WHEN DECIDING WHO IS AND Is NOT AN EMPLOYEE
Title VII
The following recent cases exemplify the approaches modem
courts have taken toward determining who is and is not an
employee under Title VII.
Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C.
In Rosenblatt, a federal district court determined that a
nonequity partner in a law firm was an employee for Title VII
purposes.5 9 This case presented an interesting situation because
when the plaintiff joined the firm, it was organized as a
53. See id. at 272. The court noted but basically disregarded the factors used in cases in
which a court must distinguish between an independent contractor and an employee. Such
factors include whether the occupation requires skill, "whether the employer 'furnishes the
equipment used and the place of work,' [the] 'length of time during which the individual has
worked,'" and whether payment is by the job or by time spent. Id. (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 277.
55. See id. at 275-76. In a later case, Auld v. Cooper, Beckmen, & Tuerk, No. 92-1356,
1992 WL 372949 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 1992), The Fourth Circuit decided whether partners were
employees to determine if a law firm had enough employees to be subject to Title VII. In
holding that a partner is not an employee for purposes of Title VII, the court did not closely
examine the duties and responsibilities of the partners, proclaiming only that "partners have
a financial stake in the firm's success, and directly govern operations." Id. at *2.
56. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 276.
57. See, e.g., Evans v. McDonald's Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1991)
(discussing Wheeler in deciding if a franchisee is an employee for Title VII purposes).
58. 969 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
59. See id. at 208.
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partnership, but when the firm dismissed the plaintiff, it was
organized as a professional corporation.'
The court did not fully explain its reasoning, but it appears the
court applied a per se rule that only a shareholder in a professional
corporation can be an employer. The court stated that "where
defendant is admittedly a professional corporation of which plaintiff
is a non-equity partner, plaintiff is a corporate employee for Title
VII purposes." 1 If the organization had been a partnership, the
60. See id. at 210. Due to the fact that professional corporations are a somewhat new
entity, this area of the law has not yet completely evolved. All courts do not currently
consider the facts of each situation in determining whether a shareholder is an employee of
a professional corporation. For instance, in EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th
Cir. 1984), shareholders in a professional corporation were held to be similar to partners and
therefore not employees. The court stated that tlhe economic reality of the professional
corporation in Illinois is that the management, control, and ownership of the corporation is
much like the management, control, and ownership of a partnership. We therefore see no
reason to treat the shareholders of a professional corporation differently for purposes of Title
VII actions than we did partners of the accounting firm in Burke." Id. at 1178; see also supra
text accompanying notes 28-34.
Some courts have considered surrounding circumstances, but still found the
shareholder to be an employer. In Fountain u. Metcalf, Zima& Co. PA., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th
Cir. 1991), the court looked at control, management, and ownership factors, as did the court
in Serapion. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997). Fountain, a
shareholder, was liable for the firm's losses and expenses, compensated based on the firm's
profits, could vote his 31% share of ownership, and had input into employment decisions. See
Fountain, 925 F.2d at 1401. The court found that Fountain was not an employee. See id.
In another case, EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.2d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996), in holding
that the employer's directors were also employees for purposes of the ADEA, the court
applied a three part test: "(1) whether the director has undertaken traditional employee
duties; (2) whether the director was regularly employed by a separate entity;, [and] (3)
whether the director reported to someone higher in the hierarchy." Id. at 1539 (citing
Lattanzio v. Security Natl Bank, 825 F. Supp. 86, 90 (E.D. Pa 1993)).
Finally, some courts have found that shareholders of professional corporations are
employees. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology, P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that once the defendant corporation elected to do business in the corporate form, it
was precluded from asserting that economic realities entitled it to be treated as a de facto
partnership for Title VII purposes); Johnson v. Cooper, Deans & Cargill, P.A, 884 F. Supp.
43, 45 (D.N.H. 1994) (arguing that defendant corporation cannot avoid liability under Title
VII by calling its employees who own shares "partners"); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot
and Mannino, P.C., 670 F. Supp. 597, 601 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (finding a shareholder in a
professional corporation to be an employee and using a hybrid test, "combining the common
law 'right to control' standard with the 'economic realities' standard").
The employer/employee dilemma has arisen in the context ofother corporate entities
as well. For a discussion of the liability of directors and officers in corporations, see generally
Robert Cavallaro, Note, Corporate Buyer Beware: Deficiencies in Directors' and Officers'
Insurance for Employment Practices Liability, 26 HOFTRA L. REV. 217 (1997). For a
complete discussion of the employee versus employer issue with regard to limited liability
corporations, see generally Daniel S. Kleinberger, 'Magnificant Circularity" and the
Churkendoose: LLC Members and Federal Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 477
(1997).
61. Rosenblatt, 969 F. Supp. at 215.
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court would have found the plaintiff to be an employee of the
partnership as well."2
The court acknowledged that a partner is only an employer
when a "true partnership relationship exists~' and this is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.64 The court then looked to
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates,6 5 a professional
corporation case in which the plaintiff alleged discrimination under
the ADEA. In Hyland, the court distinguished corporate employees
from partners." "Where the individual involved is a corporate
employee ... we hold that every such employee is 'covered' for
purposes of the ADEA and that any inquiry respecting partnership
status would be irrelevant."6 7
The Rosenblatt court seemed to focus on the fact that
Rosenblatt was a nonequity partner, not an equity partner.
Without regard to Rosenblatt's management duties or control of
corporate decisions, the court found him to be an employee because
he lacked a share of the financial pie that belonged to the two
shareholders. Thus, to the Rosenblatt court, the only factor to be
weighed in determining partnership status is whether an
ownership interest is involved.
Serapion v. Martinez
One of the most notable recent cases is Serapion v. Martinez.
6 8
Margarita Serapi6n became a "junior" or "non-proprietary" partner
in the firm of Colorado, Martfnez, Odell Calabria & Sierra in 1986.9
In 1990, she became a "senior" or "proprietary" partner.7 0 Her
compensation was not equivalent to the named partners, 1 but she
did become a voting member of the firm's Executive Board and
assumed liability for the firm's actions.72 Although the named
partners promised Serapi6n that she would be compensated equally
to the named partners within three years, the firm broke up before
the three year period ended and the promise was never realized.7
Three of the named partners and most of the other lawyers at the
62. See id. at 214-16.
63. Id. at 214.
64. See id. at 215.
65. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
66. See ii at 798.
67. Id.
68. 119 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1997).
69. See id. at 984.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 985.
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firm formed a new firm, which Serapi6n was not invited to join. 4
The lower court, at the summary judgment stage, found for the
defendants because it found Serapi6n not to be an employee.7 5 The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court.73
The court used three basic categories, "ownership, remuneration,
and management,"77 to determine whether Serapi6n was an
employee or an employer. Each category included a number of
different factors that may vary from case to case. 8 The three
categories themselves were only guidance, the court noted, and
deserved a different amount of emphasis depending on the facts of
the case at hand.7' The court recommended the use of a "totality of
the circumstances" standard for the "close" cases in which a court
may find it difficult to decide whether a partner is an employee.80
Factors under the first category, ownership, include "ownership
of firm assets and liability for firm debts and obligations.""' The
second category is remuneration. "Under [remuneration], the most
relevant factor is whether (and if so, to what extent) the individual's
compensation is based on the firm's profits." 2 A less important
factor is what kind of fringe benefits the person receives, as
compared to "similarly situated employees who possess no
ownership interest."" The factors in the third category,
management, include the right to engage in policymaking,
participation and voting power in firm governance, ability to direct
firm activities of employees, and ability to act for the firm and its
principles8 4
The court grouped together the categories of ownership and
remuneration and found "powerful indications," in both categories,
that Serapi6n was an employer.85 Her compensation, to a great
degree, depended on the firm's profits, and she was liable for any
74. See id.
75. See id. at 990.
76. See id. at 993.
77. See id. at 990. This test has been caled the "ownership, compensation, and
management hybrid test." David R. Stras, An Invitation to Discrimination: How Congress
and the Courts Leave Most Partners and Shareholders Unprotected from Discriminatory
Employment Practices, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 239, 256 (1998).
78. See Serapion, 119 F.3d at 990.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 990. Because the decision was determining the outcome of a summary
judgment motion, the court considered only the partnership agreement, the firm's Executive
Committee notes, and facts agreed upon by the parties. See id. at 990-91.
81. Id. at 990.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 991.
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losses of the firm." Serapi6n also "received very generous fringe
benefits," including a car allowance of over $10,000 per year and a
yearly discretionary allowance of $16,400.7 The court described
this as "comparable" to other proprietary partners and "more
extravagant" than junior partners."' Under the categories of
ownership and remuneration, she was clearly an employer in the
court's eyes. 9
In the third category, management, the court found the
determination under this prong of the test "less clear."" Serapi6n
attended meetings of the Board of Partners but did not vote because
nonproprietary partners could not vote. 1 She was, however, a
voting member of the Executive Committee, a committee that dealt
with issues such as employment matters, accession of new partners,
and fees. 2 Meeting minutes indicated she was an involved
participant.93 The court also made special note of the fact that she
signed checks for the firm.9 Thus, Serapi6n's management went
beyond her membership on the Board of Partners and included her
involvement as a voting member of the executive committee. This
additional responsibility qualified her as an employer.9 5
Serapi6n argued that her position and influence as a partner
were less than those of the other four partners, and therefore she
was an employee of the more senior partners." The court made it
clear, however, that having less power and influence than the other
partners did not mean that she was an employee.97
Serapi6n also pointed out that although she had the right to
vote and was a member of the boards and committees of the firm,
she had no influence within them.98 The court again refuted her
argument, stating that some persons naturally tend to dominate
meetings but that this does not necessarily mean the others are
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 991-92.
97. See id. at 992.
98. See id.
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employees." The court concluded that "all roads lead to Rome....
[Serapi6n is a] bona fide equity partner."1°°
Related Statutes
Statutes with similar definitions of employee and employer
often are construed together." 1 The following cases exemplify
courts' recent decisions involving statutes with definitions of
employer and employee similar to Title VII.
Strother v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group"2
In Strother, an African-American woman partner in a medical
group alleged racial and gender discrimination under the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).° 3 FEHA defines an
employee as "[a]n y individual under the direction and control of an
employer."'' The lower court dismissed the claim on summary
judgment; the court said Strother could not possibly "plead [a] set
of facts to show that she was actually an 'employee.' 10 5 The lower
court made its decision that she "was not an employee based solely
on her complaint, the attached partnership agreement, and
Strother's 'partner' label."" s The appeals court reversed the lower
court and noted that the partnership agreement stated that
Strother had little control of the company (the control was within
the Board of Directors), her compensation was based upon her
performance to some degree, and she could be "disciplined for poor
performance. "107 With only a few facts to consider, the appeals
court found a genuine issue of material fact to sustain the case. The
court declared that "determining whether an individual is an
'employee' typically requires a factual inquiry which goes beyond
merely the partnership agreement and the 'partner' label."0 ' The
court stated:
Courts must analyze the true relationship among partners,
including the method of compensation, the "partner's"
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. See Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 969 F. Supp. 207,214 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
102. 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996).
103. See id. at 863-64.
104. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7286.5(b) (1995). California uses Title VII and ADEA cases
to interpret FEHA. See Strother, 79 F.3d at 866.
105. Strother, 79 F.3d at 868.
106. Id. at 867.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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responsibility for partnership liabilities, and the management
structure and the "partner's" role in that management, to
determine if an individual should be treated as a partner or an
employee for the purpose of employment discrimination laws.'
The appeals court claimed that it examined the facts and analyzed
whether a true partnership relationship existed, but in actuality,
the court applied a per se rule.
Siko v. Kassab, Archbold & O'Brien, L.L.P. 11 o
In Siko, the plaintiff alleged a violation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA)."' As does Title VII, the FMLA also
defines an employee as "any individual employed by an
employer."'" The court cited factors discussed in Serapion"' and
Simpson114 as those a court should use when trying to determine
whether an individual is a bona fide partner or an employee."'
The Siko court, however, analyzed the factors as a list of thirteen:
(1) the right and duty to participate in management; (2) the
right and duty to act as an agent of other partners; (3) exposure
to liability; (4) the fiduciary relationship among partners; (5)
use of the term "co-owners" to indicate each partner's "power of
ultimate control"; (6) participation in profits and losses; (7)
investment in the firm; (8) partial ownership of firm assets; (9)
voting rights; (10) the aggrieved individual's ability to control
and operate the business; (11) the extent to which the aggrieved
individual's compensation was calculated as a percentage of the
firm's profits; (12) the extent of the individual's employment
security; (13) and other similar indicia of ownership.11
109. Id.
110. No. CIV.A.98-402, 1998 WL 464900 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1998).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994). Under the FMLA, the Act only applies to employers with
fifty or more employees. See id § 2611(4XAXi). The defendant in this case had 45 employees
that were not partners. If the partners in the firm were considered employees, the plaintiff
could have brought her case under the Act because the defendant would have employed more
than fifty people. See Siho, 1998 WL 464900, at "4.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) The FMLA actually defers to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) definition of employee, which is found in 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1994). See Siio, 1998 WL
464900, at *4. Senator Hugo Black stated that the definition of employee under the FLSA
was the "broadest definition that has ever been included in any one (A]ct.' 81 CONG. REC.
7657 (1937) (statement of Sen. Black).
113. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 989 (1st Cir. 1997).
114. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young 100 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 1996).
115. See Siko, 1998 WL 464900, at *5.
116. Id. at *5 n.4 (citations omitted).
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The decision was made on a summary judgment motion, and the
court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
partners were employers.11 The court found that the partners at
issue could be considered employees."' The important distinction,
the court noted, was that as part of a limited liability partnership,
the partners were not liable for all of the losses and benefits of the
partnership-a very different situation from Wheeler and Hull."9
Thus, the existence of a limited liability partnership could support
a finding that partners are employees in the Title VII area as well.
The court noted that a dispute also existed as to whether "of
counsel" employees are independent contractors rather than
employees. 20 As the defendant had not provided the court with
enough information to rule on that issue, the court noted only that
the same factors listed above would be applied to "of counsel"
members of the firm and used to establish their status as employer
or employee.'
POLICIES UNDERLYING RECENT COURT DECISIONS
A few different rationales seem to underlie recent court
decisions that determine who is and is not an employee. These
rationales are explored below.
If one is a partner in a large group of partners, she is more likely
to be classified as an employee.
It seems obvious that the role of one partner may not be the
same as that of another partner.'22 In today's world, large
professional firms are getting larger; and with growth comes more
partners. 2 Power still remains in the hands of the few, and lower
level partners in a larger organization may more easily be seen as
employees, as compared to small partnerships with only a few
members and a more even distribution of power.'
117. See id. at 05.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987 (Ist Cir. 1997).
123. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 266 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing statistical
data reporting U.S. partnerships in service areas grew from 239,000 in 1979 to 306,000 in
1983).
124. See Charles S. Caulkins & James J. McDonald, Jr., Lawyer Terminations:
Increasingly the Subject of Employment Discrimination Suits, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1991, at 27,27.
65920001
660 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:645
For example, the Strother case involved a large medical
partnership.U Although the decision involved was only a summary
judgment motion and made no final determination as to Strother's
status as an employee or an employer, the court suggested reasons
why she might not have been an employer.126 As with Strother,
lower level partners often are subject to employment evaluations,
do not participate in many "management" decisions, and their
compensation may not be tied to the partnership's profits. These job
characteristics reflect the role held by many lower level partners in
large firms.
In another case involving a large firm, Simpson v. Ernst &
Young,127 the court held that the partner was an employee for the
purposes of the ADEA. 28 The court found that the necessary
indicia of ownership was not present.129 In a similar large
accounting firm case, Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Company,1" the court found that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the plaintiff was an employee, able to sue
under the ADEA."31 At the time of the case, the accounting firm
had 1350 partners, only 300 of whom were in management
positions.1 32 Thus, the size of the partnership and the allocation of
management duties may be key factors in a court's decision.
If one holds the title "partner,' one has the power to prevent
discrimination against oneself
Courts may be hesitant to find partners, even those with little
or no control in the partnership, to be employees because of the
belief that a partner is in a better position, as compared to a
nonpartner, to stop discrimination due to the partner's co-
ownership interest and all that comes with it.133 Courts continually
have struggled to determine where to draw the line in the spectrum
125. See Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir.
1996).
126. See supra text accompanying note 107.
127. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
128. See id. at 444.
129. See id. at 443-44.
130. 717 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
131. See id. at 223.
132. See id. The ratio of partners to associates or nonpartners is not always a significant
issue. As the court in Serapion stated, "[wle take judicial notice of the fact that many law
firms have partner/associate ratios near one-to-one, yet few lawyers working for these firms
would deny that the partners enjoy a status fundamentally different from that of the
associates." Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 991 n.7 (1st Cir. 1997).
133. See Gingiss, supra note 5, at 31-37.
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of power among partners in name only and partners with the power
of a true employer."3 ' Tests used by the courts often focus on
various powers and sources of power available to partners because
those powers theoretically will enable a partner to deal with
discrimination more or less easily.
For example, in Serapion, although the court found clear
indications that Serapi6n held the power of an employer,135 that did
not necessarily mean that she had the power to avoid
discrimination. She attended partnership meetings and wrote
checks for the firm, allowing her to have some power in the firm;36
yet she did not have nearly as much power as the other partners in
the firm did.'37
There are indications in recent cases, however, that some
courts would label partners to be employers only when they have
significant power in a partnership. For example, the court in Siko
utilized factors that would attest to the power that is present in a
partner who can prevent being a target of discrimination." Three
of the thirteen factors named by the court include the right and
duty to participate in management, voting rights, and the extent of
an individual's employment security.'39 Although the court made
no determination as to Siko's status, a partner who meets those
criteria likely can avoid workplace discrimination. In contrast, the
court in Strother found that Strother did not have the power of a
partner who can avoid discrimination; rather, Strother was a small
fish in a big pond.' ° Thus, Strother properly was found to be an
employee.
If one makes more money than most people do in the employ of the
partnership, one must be an employer.
One of the major goals, if not the main goal, of any business is
to make money. Partners make the most money in any
partnership, although not all partners make the same amount of
money. In fact, there may be a large gap in partners' salaries. Still,
some courts consider the ability to make a lot of money to be key to
134. See, e.g., Serapion, 119 F.3d at 990 (holding status determinations must be made
along a continuum with no single factor given significantly more weight).
135. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
136. See Serapion, 119 F.3d at 991.
137. See ii at 991-92; see also supr text accompanying notes 90-91.
138. See Siko v. Kassab, Archbold & O'Brien, L.L.P., No. CIV.A.98-402, 1998 WL 464900,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1998).
139. See supra text accompanying note 116.
140. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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the decision of who is and is not an employee. Courts generally give
the economic strength of a partner more weight than the amount of
management control of the partner. This is exemplified in both
Serapion and Rosenblatt.
The grouping of the three overall factors used by the Serapion
court--ownership, remuneration, and management-all seemed to
come down to a bottom line: was Serapi6n making a lot of money?
The court heavily weighed the economic factors and basically
disregarded Serapi6n's lack of management control."' Likewise, in
Siko, ten of the thirteen factors listed by the court involved
economic issues."" Additionally, in Rosenblatt, the court based its
decision on the fact that Rosenblatt was a nonequity partner, who
did not hold the same economic power as partners with equity. 43
Many courts view salary as the deciding factors in determining who
is an employer.
RECOMMENDATION: A PRESUMPTION OF EMPLOYEE STATUS,
REBUTTED By THE MANAGERIAL CONTROIECONOMIC STATUS TEST
The emphasis of courts seems to be moving more toward
economic, rather than control, factors. Perhaps this movement is
because the goal of a partnership or corporation is to make money,
and a person's place in furthering that goal, or being held
accountable for not reaching that goal, more accurately reflects who
is an employer or an employee. Yet, this emphasis seems to go
directly against the ideals of anti-discrimination statutes. It is the
power of a person, or rather the lack thereof, that causes her to be
subject to discrimination and at the mercy of those who
discriminate.' 44 Anti-discrimination statutes seek to protect those
with less power. Perhaps an inquiry into the economic indicia of
ownership is appropriate to determine who really has the power
within an organization, but other indicia of power must be at least
equally important. The Serapion test is good in that it combines
such factors, yet the case exemplifies how such a test can be
manipulated and abused. The two weighted factors, ownership and
remuneration, were solely economic. The third factor,
141. See supra text accompanying notes 85-95.
142. See supra text accompanying note 116.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 61.
144. See, e.g., Bridge, supra note 16, at 639-42 (analyzing the case of Ezold v. Wolf, Block,
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990), in which gender stereotypes may
have influenced employment evaluations and allowed an all-male partnership to deny a
woman promotion to partner).
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management, was minimized completely. The court claimed that
the "totality of the circumstances" must be viewed,145 but it ignored
the blatant action of forming an entire law firm less one person and
the power differential that allowed such discriminatory action to
occur.
Given that federal courts do not use a uniform test to
determine whether a partner is an employer or employee, there is
a great need for certainty in this area of the law. This problem of
interpretation of a partner's status as an employer or employee
within the partnership can be solved.'"6 One solution would be to
allow a partner filing suit under Title VII to enjoy a rebuttable
presumption of employee status.47 To overcome the presumption,
the partnership would have to prove, using "substantial evidence [,]
that the plaintiff shared in the firm's profits and had joint control
of the partnership."'" This would afford partners, who are
functionally employees and therefore do not have the power of an
employer, an easier process by which to make a claim. In this way,
the interpretation of the anti-discrimination statutes would no
longer contribute to the stronghold of discriminators."'
Such a test would enable courts to apply the spirit of Title VII
more fairly and consistently. The test would focus on two central
principles that reflect power in the workplace to rebut the
presumption: managerial control and economic situation.
Managerial control, however, should be weighed more heavily, as
it is a better indicator of whether the discriminatee has any power
in the employment relationship. The following is a list of possible
factors that courts could consider within each category:
Managerial Control: power to vote; percentage of voting power
within the partnership; the size of the partnership; power to fire
or hire nonpartners and partners; power to control her own
business or assignments; power to provide input to the
partnership.
145. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997).
146. The approach taken by the English, for instance, is to protect all partners from sex
discrimination regardless of their status of employee or employer. See Gingiss, supra note
5, at 22.
147. See McCoach, supra note 26, at 774-75.
148. Id. at 775.
149. The Supreme Court said of the interpretation of the word "employee" in a
congressionally approved statute: 'Congress... was not thinking solely of the immediate
technical relation of employer and employee. It had in mind at least some other persons than
those standing in the proximate legal relation of employee to the particular employer
involved in the ... dispute." Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (1987) (quoting NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (194)).
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Economic Situation: power to represent the partnership in
economic matters, i.e. power to write checks, power over
salaries, etc.; share in the losses or gains of the partnership;
earning level as compared to other partners.
This test would make the courts'job easier and simpler. In a clear
manner, the test considers the two most important parts of the
equation: the actual control a partner has within the partnership
and the economic power and liability a partner maintains within
the partnership. Importantly, a court's main investigation is into
the amount of managerial control, ensuring that one who is found
to be an employer does have enough control to avoid discrimination.
By more clearly focusing on the most important indicia of true
partners and emphasizing the control that is so key to the purpose
of Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, courts could
make better decisions as to who deserves their protection and who
does not.
CONCLUSION: HONORING THE PURPOSE OF TITLE VII
Title VII and other statutes' definitions have not provided the
guidance courts need to determine who is an employer and who is
an employee. The courts have been forced to fill in the gaps.
Originally, courts found no liability was possible for a partnership
that was being sued by a member partner. Then, some courts,
attempting to look at the facts of each case, found liability for a
partnership in lawsuits by partners who were functionally closer to
employees rather than employers.
The tests used by courts, with varying factors, have caused
uncertainty. Although some of the same factors are being used
today as were used by the early courts, the early courts "applied"
such factors in what were really per se decisions of no liability, with
no real examination of the factors, always finding a partner to be an
employer. Today courts actually examine the circumstances instead
of making an automatic assumption.
Questions still remain, though, regarding many aspects of the
tests used by courts today. What factors are the most important in
making the distinction between an employee and employer:
economic status or managerial control? How can a partnership
know who within the partnership is an employer or employee
without litigating the question?
Courts have focused on a variety of factors, as evidenced by the
discussions of the cases within this Note. Many of the same factors
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continue to be used, but under different guises and with differing
weight. Whereas some courts have relied on definitions and
reasoning provided by the Uniform Partnership Act,50 the economic
indicia of ownership seem to continue to be a favorite of the
courts,15 but should this be the case?
Anti-discrimination statutes should protect those who lack the
power to protect themselves through other means. The economic
position of a partner within a partnership may not provide the court
with a clear picture, or at least not a complete picture, of the power
relationship within a partnership. Other factors should be weighed
equally with, or more heavily than, the economic factors
emphasized by the courts today. One such issue that courts
implicitly consider is the size of the partnership, which sheds light
on one's power within the partnership. That and other indicia of
managerial control will help courts determine whether a partner
was truly vulnerable to discrimination.
A presumption that a partner is an employee for Title VII
purposes, rebuttable by a primary examination of the partner's
managerial control within the organization and a secondary
examination of her economic status, will ensure that the courts
engage in a proper balancing of factors when determining whether
partners may involve Title VII.
The purpose of anti-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII,
should be at the forefront of any debate regarding the definition of
"employer" and "employee." To carry out the spirit of these
statutes, as courts have been tasked to do, the courts must ensure
that those who deserve the protection of these statutes are
recognized as such and afforded the rights intended by Congress.
DAwN S. SHERMAN
150. See supra note 30.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
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